Does Ombudsman's immediate implementation
of decisions despite motion for reconsideration
conform with the Constitution?
Does it conform to logic, law and the Constitution for the Ombudsman to implement immediately its decisions despite a motion for reconsideration?
Remember that Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza died on 23 August 2010 while taking Hong Kong tourists hostage at the Quirino Grandstand in Luneta, Manila. The reason? The decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of extortion was being implemented against him despite the existence of his Motion for Reconsideration.
The concept of unconstitutionality of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure that directs the immediate implementation of its decision although being challenged by a motion for reconsideration has come to the fore because of a client who fell into this circumstance after the Office issued a Consolidated Decision finding her guilty of grave misconduct.
The Ombudsman says that my client was guilty of grave misconduct just because she certified the signatures of the payeee of a check as genuine signatures when the payee disowned the same.
Let us not talk about the merits of the case of grave misconduct. Let us limit this discussion only to the constitutional viability of the provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In the petition to declare the particular provision of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, I argued that the amended version of Section 7 of Rule III therein is not jibing with the Constitution, particular Section 1 of Article III that says: "NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW NOR ANY PERSON SHALL BE DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW."
I underscored the significance of the modifying word "due" before the word "process." To my mind, once a procedure is laid out to be followed, any person subjected to the same procedure have that basic human right under the Constitution has as a matter of right that entitlement to avail of the entire process, not just half or one-third of the process.
In the case of the rules of the Ombudsman, it gives right to persons affected that right to file a motion for reconsideration against its decisions in administrative cases. However, it becomes inconsistent to logic that they would not anyway respect the motion for reconsideration filed because it will implement immediately the decisions.
I am mindful of the truth that the Ombudsman cannot assure that its decisions are correct. With this alone, it would be so unfair to subject respondents to removal from office.
I am also mindful of the truth that the same provision of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman violates the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE of the Constitution. In the case of government employees found guilty in the administrative cases in their own respective offices, like the PNP that does not implement its decision if there existed a motion for reconsideration as spelled out clearly in its procedure under Memorandum Circular No. 2007-01. Under the Civil Service Commission rules, decisions cannot be implemented yet if the respondents found guilty timely filed their motions for reconsideration. To my mind, there is no substantial distinction between administrative cases under other rules of procedure and administrative cases under the Office of the Ombudsman.
I am also mindful of the incorrectness of the justification given by the Ombudsman in immediately implementing its decisions, insisting that the respondents found innocent later on a motion for reconsideration or on appeal will anyway be refunded of salaries and all other emoluments that were not received during the period that the wrong decisions were being implemented, where the "guilty" respondents are actually terminated or suspended from their respective offices. THIS IS NOT JUSTICE because the damage to the moral of the persons concerned, the damage to their honor and the name of their families in their communities can never be recovered anymore by any form of acquittal. They cannot also recover the expenses they incurred in paying for the lawyers to seek vindication and the opportunity to be promoted in office that is lost because the concerned respondents are already deemed terminated from employment in the government.
I also argued in this petition that the definition being given by the Office of the Ombudsman to the word "decisions" is skewed and incorrect.
To my mind, "decisions" must be strictly limited to those decisions or final orders that are no longer challenged by motions for reconsideration or where the motions for reconsideration were already disposed of.
If you are interested to read a very long petition, read it below:
Republic of the Philippines
JOSEPHINE I. CAINGAT,
- versus - GR No. _______________
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
and MELANIE P. MINA,
Petition for Certiorari
Petitioner Josephine I. Caingat, by the undersigned attorney, respectfully files this Petition for Certiorari.
(1) This petition comes to this Court as the last bulwark of the enforcement of the Constitutional Right to Due Process and due to the fact that the lower courts will not decide questions of validity of a law or a provision of rules of procedure promulgated by a Constitutional body having exclusive jurisdiction.
(2) The decision to file this petition directly before the Supreme Court is also dictated by the facts: (a) that there is extreme urgency to act on; (b) that the questions involved are pure questions of law and questions of the Constitution; (c) that these questions of law and constitution can only be interpreted correctly and with finality by the Supreme Court; (d) that to file this petition before the Court of Appeals is a waste of time because the Court of Appeals has no power to invalidate a provision of the Rules of Procedure of an independent office that is the Office of the Ombudsman; (e) that direct resort to the Supreme Court is the most logical and the only practical way; (f) that the issues involved are considered as transcendental that the decision of the Highest Court in this case shall be a good guidance in the future about these issues that are capable of repetition and yet evading review; and (g) that there is actual controversy here involving the petitioner’s rights to the basic Constitutional due process that will also be repeating in other persons in the future.
(3) In particular, the petition seeks the declaration of unconstitutionality of a provision in the Rules of Procedure of a constitutional body that is the Office of the Ombudsman.
(4) The said provision was promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman in the exercise of its exclusive power to promulgate its own rules as granted by the Constitution.
(5) The position of the petitioner is that the same provision was done in the excessive exercise of exclusive Constitutional power and this excess caused her extreme prejudice in violation of her right under the Constitutional Due Process.
(6) This constitutionality issue of the provision being challenged here is the very lis mota of this petition;
(7) The provision being referred to is one that created an issue that cannot be resolved without resolving the same constitutional issue that is now being raised.
(8) This petition for certiorari does not include the issue of correctness or incorrectness of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in arriving at a conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct.
(9) The petition merely brings up the issue of grave abuse of discretion in implementing right away the decision in that grave misconduct case when the petitioner timely filed her Motion for Reconsideration.
(10) Specifically, the matters involved in these challenges here as unconstitutional are: (a) Section 7 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman as amended; (b) Administrative Order No. 17 making decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman as immediately executory despite pending appeal; and (c) Memorandum Circular No. 01, series of 2006, of the Office of the Ombudsman that directed that “a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman shall be executed as a matter of course.”
(11) The said Section 7 provides as follows:
Sec. 7. FINALITY OF DECISION. — Where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to one (1) month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.
(12) The same Section 7 was amended by Administrative Order No. 17 of the Office of the Ombudsman so that Section 7 now reads as follows:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.- Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
(13) Memorandum Circular No. 1 Series of 2006 merely reminds of the provision in Administrative Order No. 17 that states that “a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman shall be executed as a matter of course.”
(14) Now, in the event that the Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of Administrative Order No. 7 as amended, the petitioner also asks the Supreme Court to rule as grave abuse of discretion that obvious interpretation by the Office of the Ombudsman that phrase “a matter of course” to include the situation where a respondent has filed a timely motion for reconsideration from the finding of guilt on grave misconduct.
(15) Ergo, the instant case will dwell on the issue of constitutionality of Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman as amended and the issue of grave abuse of discretion in interpreting “as a matter of course” to mean that any decision must be implemented or executed despite the timely motion for reconsideration.
(16) The same Consolidated Decision is poised to be implemented by the Secretary of Finance who is being ordered to implement the same decision.
(17) Additionally, the same Administrative Order No. 7 interpreted to mean that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman must be implemented right away despite the existence of the pending motion for reconsideration violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution so that it is also unconstitutional upon this reason.
(18) In administrative adjudication of the Department of Finance where the petitioner belongs, its decisions are stayed if challenged by a timely motion for reconsideration.
(19) There is no substantial distinction between the decision of the DOF in administrative adjudication cases as against the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative adjudication.
(20) Hence, it is clear that there is grave abuse of discretion to implement the same Consolidated Decision here when it is clear it violates the Equal Protection Clause.
(21) The foregoing statements encapsulate the entirety of this case here.
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or
Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO)
(22) Now, there is extreme urgency in the necessity for the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) because the petitioner learned that the Secretary of Finance has already instructed the regional office of the Department of Finance to implement the same Consolidated Decision.
(23) In fact, the petitioner learned that an order was already signed to implement the same Consolidated Decision.
(24) This fear caused anxieties to build up in the human body of the petitioner.
(25) It is not disputable that anxieties also cause stress into the body.
(26) It is also not disputable that stresses are roots of stroke that kills a person.
(27) Therefore, the life of the petitioner is in grave danger at the moment that ONLY A TRO or a SQAO can remove all these dangers.
(28) Additionally, the petitioner has clear, unmistakable and unequivocal right not to be dismissed or suspended from the office to which she was appointed and to which she took an oath to serve well, as well as to which she has security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution and the Civil Service laws.
(29) That clear right not to be removed from the same Office of the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija owes life from the rule that when a motion for reconsideration is filed the decision being challenged is deemed to have not existed at all and the case concerned goes back to square one.
(30) That clear right is also owes life from Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution that states: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”
(31) In this case, the due process of law includes the completion of the motion for reconsideration and the resolution thereon.
(32) Because the same motion for reconsideration has not yet been decided within five (5) days as mandated by the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, with more reason that the right of the petitioner against implementation of the same Consolidated Decision becomes clearer.
(33) The right against implementation of the same Consolidate Decision become clearer when a motion for reconsideration automatically stays the decision in all other administrative jurisdiction.
(34) If the same administrative case is filed before the Department of Finance, a finding of guilt in a decision will be stayed the moment the guilty respondent files a motion for reconsideration.
(35) There is also a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution if it were to allow the implementation of the Consolidated Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in this case.
(36) In the case of others found guilty by the Department of Finance in administrative cases, they enjoy the stay of the decision when they filed motions for reconsideration.
(37) There is no reason to distinguish the decision in the Office of the Ombudsman as against the decisions in all other administrative bodies.
(38) Ergo, the Supreme Court must issue the TRO or the SQAO as prayed for here without delay.
(39) In case the Consolidated Decision is implemented, it is prayed that the Supreme Court issue a Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) because by then the TRO is no longer applicable.
(40) If Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) is implemented, the petitioner must be reinstated at her office even after the consolidated decision is already implemented before such SQAO was issued.
(41) Aside from the said provision of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, the basis of the time computation for the purpose of timeliness of this Petition for Certiorari is 25 November 2015, the date when the law firm of the undersigned counsel received the Consolidated Resolution finding her guilty of grave misconduct in OMB-L-A-09-0259-E, entitled “MELANIE P. MINA vs ABUNDIA L. GARCIA, JOSEPHIND I. CAINGAT and NOEL GAMBOA.”
(42) The sixty (60) days as computed shall end on 23 January 2015.
(43) The filing of this Petition for Certiorari today, 20 January 2016, therefore is timely.
(44) It is stressed that until 25 November 2015, the undersigned law firm (formerly Renta Pe & Associates) was still the standing counsel of record of the petitioner and her co-respondents in this case as proved by the “copy furnished” spaces of the Consolidated Decision at the end of thereof.
(45) An original copy of the Consolidated Decision was received on 25 November 2015 by the security guard on duty at 305-A National Press Club Bldg., Magallanes Drive, Intramuros, Manila.
(46) The law firm of the undersigned transferred to its present address written below.
(47) Until today, petitioner Josephine I. Caingat has not discharged the law firm (previously Renta Pe) as her counsel of record.
(48) Nevertheless, the same original copy of the Consolidated Decision is attached hereto as ANNEX “A” in series.
(49) If based on 25 November 2015 that is the actual date of receipt of the Consolidated Decision, the last day of petitioner Caingat to file her Motion for Reconsideration should be on 5 December 2015.
(50) However, Caingat based the filing of her motion for reconsideration on 16 November 2015, the day she actually received her copy of the Consolidated Decision, without minding that only the receipt of her counsel should bind her.
(51) At any rate, she filed her Motion for Reconsideration on 26 November 2015 using another lawyer, Atty. Fernando Cresente C. Hernandez.
(52) A certified true copy of the same Motion for Reconsideration is attached hereto as ANNEX “B” series.
(53) Ergo, the instant Petition for Certiorari with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) is timely filed.
(54) Moreover, at the time of filing of this Petition, the same Consolidated Decision was not yet implemented although the petitioner expects it very soon.
The Reasons for Allowance of the Petition
(55) Humbly aside, the instant petition should be allowed and given due course because it complied with the jurisdictional requirement that is the existence of grave abuse of discretion as alleged in this Petition.
(56) It is a time-honored rule that the allegations in the complaint or petition are the test of sufficiency in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the petition or complaint.
(57) The same is timely filed as stated above.
(58) The parties here as stated below are proper parties.
(59) The appeal provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is only for the challenging of the merits of the main case but not to the issue of whether the immediate implementation of the Consolidated Decision is proper, legal and constitutional.
(60) There is also no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available under the law.
(61) Neither can the Office of the Ombudsman be expected to amend its Rules of Procedure just to change the immediate implementation provision into non-implementation upon the existence of a motion for reconsideration.
(62) And even if it is amended or revoked, it can no longer catch up with the instant case to save the petitioner from the revolting injustice.
(63) Although it is not proper in this case because findings of facts are not the province of the Supreme Court, the petitioner wishes to stress that SHE DID NOT GET ANY SINGLE CENTAVO FROM THE ACTS DEEMED IMPROPER BY THE OMBUDSMAN.
(64) The petitioner is Josephine I. Caingat, the incumbent municipal treasurer of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija.
(65) For this purpose, it is requested that she be served with processes or notices to her counsel in this petition, Atty. Berteni Cataluña Causing on his address written below.
(66) The private respondent is Melanie P. Mina, who may be served with notices and processes at her latest address of record is 4 Pink St., Manuela Subd., Las Piñas City.
(67) The public respondent, Office of the Ombudsman, may be served with notices and processes at its Office at Ombudsman Bldg., Agham Road, Diliman, Quezon City.
(68) On 3 September 2014, Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer I Johanna A. Young penned her recommended Consolidated Decision that is now being referred to in this petition as the cause of it all.
(69) The same ponencia was recommended for approval by Bayani H. Jacinto, Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer II.
(70) On 8 September 2015, Tanodbayan Conchita Carpio Morales approved the same recommendation.
(71) The dispositive portion of the same decision states:
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondents in OMB-L-A-09-025 8-E is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
However, finding substantial evidence to hold respondent JOSEPHINE I. CAINGAT liable for Grave Misconduct in OMB-L-A-09-0259-E, she is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service including its accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking the civil service examination. On the other hand, the complaint against respondents ABUNDIA L. GARCIA and NOEL GAMBOA is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Secretary Cesar V. Purisima of the Department of Finance is hereby directed to implement the Decision in the administrative case immediately upon receipt hereof pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure) in relation to Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 2006, dated 11 April 2006, and to promptly inform this Office of the action taken thereon.
Quezon City, 3 September 2014.
(72) A copy of the same Consolidated Decision, which was received by the undersigned counsel on 25 November 2015, is attached hereto as ANNEX “A” series.
(73) Petition Caingat filed her timely Motion for Reconsideration on 26 November 2015 and a certified copy thereof is attached hereto as ANNEX “B” series.
(74) The petitioner has learned from sources that the DOF, through its regional office, is poised to implement the same Consolidated Decision.
(75) One fact that is material here is that there exists the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines that was ratified by the People of the Philippines.
(76) There is no doubt that the Constitution is the highest law of the land that all laws and rules of procedure must conform to in order for them to be valid, else null and void.
(77) There is also no doubt that Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution exists and there is no doubt that it states: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, not any person shall be denied the equal protection of the law.”
(78) There is also no doubt that the Office of the Ombudsman is granted exclusive power by the Constitution to promulgate its own rules of procedure for the adjudication of administrative cases.
(79) There is also no doubt that pursuant to the exclusive power the Office of the Ombudsman promulgated Administrative Order No. 07 and amended the same with another promulgation, this time of Administrative Order No. 17, amending AO No. 07 by stating that any decision of the Office of the Ombudsman shall be executed as a matter of course.
(80) There is also no doubt that the Consolidated Decision found the petitioner guilty that consequently she is DISMISSED from employment.
(81) There is also no dispute that the Office of the Ombudsman has directed the Secretary of Finance to implement the dismissal order against the petitioner and that the Secretary of Finance is directed to report compliance promptly.
(82) There is also no dispute that the administrative adjudication under the Civil Service Commission stays the decision in any case thereof once a timely motion for reconsideration is filed.
(83) There is also no dispute that the administrative adjudication under the Department of Finance stays the decision in any case thereof once a timely motion for reconsideration is filed.
(84) It is also not disputed that there is no substantial distinction between the administrative cases handled by the Office of the Ombudsman as against cases handled by other jurisdictions.
(85) Now, it appears that Section 07, Rule III of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, is repugnant to the due process clause and the equal protection clause of Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution.
(86) There is no doubt that the question of constitutionality of Administrative Order No. 07 as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 can only be resolved with finality by the Supreme Court and that all lower courts have no power to revoke or invalidate these orders exercised by a Constitutional body that is the Office of the Ombudsman granted by the Constitution the exclusive power of promulgating its Rules of Procedure.
(87) There is also no doubt that the petitioner has security of tenure granted unto her by the Constitution as a civil servant.
(88) There is also no doubt that prejudice and damages to be caused on the petitioner is so extreme and irreparable if the consolidated decision is implemented.
(89) The sickness that may be caused on the petitioner may be incurable or worse the petitioner is in peril of getting stroke with these extremely painful experiences arising from the order of dismissal.
(90) So that even if it is stated in the rules of the Ombudsman that the salaries and benefits may be reimbursed when the petitioner is acquitted, the same cannot compensate the damage done.
(91) Additionally, if the petitioner is out of the service while her motion for reconsideration or appeal, if any, is pending, she can never be considered for promotion, an opportunity that is lost totally although she must as a matter of right have the right to vie for and be chosen for a promotion in her office.
(92) So that it cannot be said that there would be no damage that can be caused on the petitioner if at the moment the dismissal order is implemented.
(93) Now, there is also no doubt that the Office of the Ombudsman cannot assure itself that its decision is correct.
(94) It is revolting to conscience and not consistent with justice to allow the Ombudsman to implement its decision that is still under challenge by a motion for reconsideration.
(95) Additionally, the act of implementing the Consolidated Decision without considering the presence of a motion for reconsideration is an ACT OF ABDICATING THE DUTY TO PERFORM THE OFFICIAL QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION granted by the Constitution unto the Office of the Ombudsman.
(96) Further, the act of the Office of the Ombudsman in implementing right away its consolidated decision despite the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration violates Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution for two counts.
(97) First, the command of Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution is that “NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.”
(98) If it speaks of due process, it means that it includes all steps provided by law or rules and that all these steps must be observed before deprivation is allowed.
(99) In the instant case, no less than the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that there shall be that right to file a motion for reconsideration against any decision of the same body.
(100) There is no doubt that this is a part of the so-called “due process” in the administrative adjudication in the Office of the Ombudsman.
(101) So that the Office violated the due process clause when it is now depriving the petitioner of her security of tenure that is tantamount to property because it is her only source of income to breathe life unto her and her family even when the petitioner timely filed her motion for reconsideration against the order dismissal due to grave misconduct.
(102) The Constitution directs the observance of “due” process, not one-half or two-third process.
(103) By implementing the decision against the petitioner, the Office of the Ombudsman is in effect not observing the process of motion for reconsideration that may be considered as ONE HALF OF THE TOTAL PROCESS.
(104) Additionally, implementing right away the consolidated decision despite the pending motion for reconsideration violates also the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
(105) That is so because in the administrative adjudication rules of the Civil Service Commission, it does not implement its decision when a motion for reconsideration is timely filed.
(106) The same is true with the administrative adjudication of the Department of Finance where the petitioner belongs: the decision is stayed.
(107) Even the present rules of the Office of the President automatically stays the implementation of the decision of the offices, bureaus, agencies and instrumentalities under it once an appeal is filed with the OP.
(108) It does not need a talisman to see that there have been some employees of the Department of Finance who had administrative cases docketed against them and for sure they are no better situated than the petitioner when there is no substantial distinction between the petitioner and her co-employees.
(109) The wisdom behind why a motion for reconsideration must stay the decision is because the filing of a timely motion for reconsideration means that there is no decision to speak of because the case goes to square one when a motion for reconsideration is filed.
(110) What is important here is that at the time of the filing of this Petition, there is no implementation yet of the decision to dismiss the petitioner, although sooner it will be implemented.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that upon filing of this petition the Supreme Court issue a STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER (SQAO) or a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) if it is still applicable.
After due notice and hearing, it is prayed that Administrative Order No. 7 as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, or the Administrative Order No. 17 alone, be declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL and the petitioner be reinstated to her office until the Office of the Ombudsman decides to deny the pending Motion for Reconsideration.
Other reliefs just and equitable are also prayed for. 20 January 2016.
Causing Sabarre Castro pELAGIO
Unit 1, No. 2368 J.B. Roxas Street corner Leon Guinto Street, Malate, Manila
BERTENI CATALUÑA CAUSING, CE
IBP No. 972694/ 04-12-2015 / Manila IV
PTR No. 4889732 / 04-12-2015 / Manila
Roll No. 60944/MCLE No. IV – 0007338 issued 10 August 2012
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Ombudsman Bldg., Agham Road, Diliman, Quezon City
MELANIE P. MINA
4 Pink St., Manuela Subd., Las Piñas City