Position Paper I wrote vs libel
Position Paper I wrote vs libel
In view of the big controversy being stirred by the Internet libel law contained in Republic Act 10175, I am publishing here the Position Paper I filed for the National Press Club before the Senate committee hearing libel decriminalization early of February 2008, which committee was headed by then Senator Richard Gordon.
Please read our justifications why libel should be scrapped.
POSITION PAPER
Of National
Press Club
on Bills
Decriminilizing of Libel or Removing Jail Term Therefrom
February 20, 2008
THE HONORABLE
COMMITTEE
ON
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS,
REVISION OF
CODES AND LAWS
Senate
of the Philippines
Thru: SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON
Committee
Chair
YOUR
HONORS:
National
Press Club of the Philippines
(NPC, for brevity) expresses its profoundest gratitude to the Senate of the Philippines for being the only institution in
the country that values the most freedom of expression, of speech, and of the
press – after the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
We
therefore take this opportunity as a liberty to exercise NPC’s “praise”
freedom, so that we now announce that the board of the biggest and the
oldest-surviving group of newsmen is going to pass a resolution to install the present
members of the Supreme Court to the Hall of Fame of the Liberty of the Press. This is because it takes the Puno Court to
change the face of the libel law that has lurked as a thief in the night
against the journalists for 78 years now since 1930.
The
Puno Court
responded quickly to the NPC letter-petition of January 3, 2008, begging for
the application of the rules of preference on libel convictions and for the
waiver by the State to its right to issue a warrant of arrest in libel unless
the accused failed to appear in court when required. In lodging our letter-petition, we had in
mind the rule being applied on probable cause findings and convictions under
the Bouncing Check Law, and Section 2 of Article III of the Philippine
Constitution which does not require issuance of warrants of arrest but merely
sets the minimum standard of probable cause if ever one is issued. Moreover, there is no law that requires
issuance of warrant of arrest for every finding of probable cause.
The
Proposed Measures on Libel
We
now go to the proposals up for deliberation by this august committee, which
proposals may be classified into two: (a)
for the removal only of the fine in libel; and (b) for the total decriminalization of libel.
In
the first kind, there are two sub-classes: (a)
penalty of P6,000.00 or less; and (b)
penalty of P100,000.00 or less.
Ironically,
Senator Loren Legarda who once belonged to the class of journalists was the one
who proposed the imposition of impoverishing penalty, despite knowledge that
most if not all journalists are already living barely in poverty.
And if a
convicted newsman is insolvent, he is still bound to go to jail as a subsidiary
penalty, under which the imprisonment shall be computed on the basis of one day
of jail for every eight pesos (P8.00) of fine.
Assuming the fine is P100,000.00, the convicted journalist
stands to be imprisoned for 12, 500 days or an equivalent of 34.25 years in
jail!
34 years in jail
for the crime of libel is extremely revolting to the conscience!
These
proposals are okay for the NPC and the journalists if there are no other
options to be offered to them by the lawmakers.
In
the second kind, Senator Chiz Escudero is alone. But his position is one that is closest to
the heart of NPC and, of course, the whole media community.
The
Position of the NPC
Of course, NPC
and almost all the journalists in the country want no less than a
decriminalized libel. Even if keeping it as a crime and punishing only with
pushups or small fines is not acceptable.
The fact that
it is designated as a crime is disgusting.
It is not consistent with the tenets of any democracy.
The Philippines is
a democratic and republican State where the rule is majority of the people and
power begins from the people. If there
is a conflict of interest between the State and the majority of the people, the
latter shall prevail.
In other
words, any law passed by the Congress constituted by the representatives of the
people should be one that benefits the majority of the people.
And if the
majority of the people demands information that can be given largely by means
of the exercise of the liberty of the press, there is no point then to put a
hindrance to the practice of journalism.
All
publications of the media benefit the people more in compliance with their
declaration in Section 7, Article III of the Constitution that they ratified,
which provision says:
Section 7. The
right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Since the
works of journalists are for the benefit of the people, in whose hands the
sovereign will as to what would be the future of the State is vested, there is
a stronger argument to free the press than serve the ego and pride of few
individuals who claim to have been shamed by the press.
Thus, NPC
cannot accept the making of the act of publishing, regardless of nature and
character, a crime.
And the fact
it is now a crime, even if the imposed penalty would only be fine, still there
is the collateral civil damages arising from the crime itself. This is in consonance with the reality that
for every criminal act there is a corresponding civil liability.
The
Reasons for the Position
A. Article III, Section 4 does not provide
exception
First, our Constitution provides no exception to warrant
intervention or infringement in the exercise of the liberty of expression, of
speech, and of the press.
Let us ask: Is
it not ironic that while other countries such as the United
States of America see no evil in libel for it to stay a
crime, the Philippines
looks at it with disfavor?
This irony is
incomprehensible considering that both the USA
and the Philippines
have almost the same provision concerning freedom of expression, of speech and
of the press.
The First
Amendment of the US
says: “Congress shall make no law …
abridging the freedom of expression…”
The Philippines’s
Article III, Section 4 says: “No law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of expression, of speech, and of the
press…”
Given this
constitutional rule, why is it that there is still libel as a crime that can be
used to punish journalists, considering that it clearly abridges the freedom
and keeps an ever-present “chilling effect” that creeps into
the mind of every journalist?
Despite this
libel, the State should be thankful. Press
in the Philippines
still appears to be free. But it is because of the devil-may-care attitude and
the insistence of the Filipino journalists to be free, come what may.
However, this
character of Filipino journalists should not be an excuse for the State not to
act to remove the chilling effect of the lurking warrant of arrest and too
prejudicial trial.
And to decide
to take this off belongs to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Thus, it is still the lawmakers, not the
courts, who can have a final say whether the said constitutional dictum must
indeed be given an absolute or qualified meaning.
If in the US
there is no criminal law but only civil damages for libel and it has proven to
be the strongest government in the world, can we now argue against their
success?
The Soviet was
bigger than the US, but the government’s policy of suppression of expression
proved to be telling that it crumbled overnight and the states that broke out
in the process had to go back to square one.
Concededly,
the Philippine Supreme Court has repeatedly pronounced that although the tenor
of the constitutional provision is very clear, it says that it shall not be
interpreted to mean absolute freedom.
This stand of the High Tribunal does not sit well with the NPC and the
journalists.
That is,
although there has been no real challenge brought before the court to attack
the constitutionality of libel law.
With the current
schools of thought gripping the minds of the legislators and the courts to
doggedly argue for qualified liberty of the press by highlighting the necessity
of subsequent punishment like libel law, the NPC can only hope and beg.
And now it begs: Please
give decriminalized libel a chance.
B. “Clear and
Present Danger Rule”
Clearly Favors
Decriminalization
Concededly
also, a survey of the Court decisions on libel cases shows leniency to laws
that merely apply after the exercise of press freedom is done.
Like libel, it
only comes in after the publication of the subject of the action. This attitude is detestable to the NPC and
the journalists.
Before
expounding on this matter, let us inform that there are four aspects of the
liberty of the press:
(a) the
freedom from prior restraint;
(b) the
freedom from subsequent punishment;
(c) the
freedom to gather information; and
(d) the
freedom to circulate, publish or broadcast.
Libel, like
inciting to sedition or inciting to rebellion, involves freedom of
expression. The Philippine standard to
date on press freedom is that it is alright to interfere by way of a subsequent
punishment. Mere substantive government
interest has been advanced to be enough to justify this act. That is, although this does not sit well with
NPC.
When it comes
to the other aspects of this liberty, the Supreme Court is very strict.
In the recent “Hello
Garci” case law, the majority ruled that the strictest standard of
“clear and present danger test” must be the basis to justify government
intervention—even if the threat was supposed to be expressed in the form of a
press release and not through a memorandum circular.
The Court said
that the press release brought forth a “chilling effect” because it came under
the circumstances when the focal issues of the press releases were Hello
Garci tapes that allegedly contain the conversation between the
President and a Comelec official, and that the officials releasing the press
release were appointed by the Chief Executive such that they were expected to
make good the threat just to serve the pleasure, the only material
qualifications to keep their office.
Despite the
controversy brought about by the Hello Garci tapes that it even
nearly sparked a regime change, the Court said there was no clear and present
danger to the existence of the state and of the government to allow the NTC and
the DOJ to issue such press releases.
The Court
clarified that the same “clear and present danger test” applies on both the
broadcast and print media when it comes to the issue of whether the
interference is valid to pierce the no-prior-restraint veil.
Now, we may
ask: is it possible for a “clear and present danger” to ever occur in libel per
se as defined by Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code?
Clearly it is
not.
The only
possibility where “clear and present danger” may occur is in the cases of libel
directed against the government. But it
is not defined in our criminal statute as libel, but as seditious libel,
inciting to sedition, or inciting to rebellion.
This is called in its generic name as “political libel” because they
affect the very foundation of the body politic, or the government, although not
necessarily of the state.
But look,
there has never been a case of seditious libel, inciting to sedition or
inciting to rebellion filed against a journalist. And if ever there is one, this should set
apart from the pure libel: that is a published imputation against the person
and honor of a public official, a public figure and a private citizen as
defined under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since there is
no “clear and present danger” to speak of in pure libel, it behooves upon the
Congress to strike out Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code and the
accompanying articles starting from Article 353.
Ergo, it is
very clear that the application of the “clear and present danger rule” favors
the decriminalization of libel.
C. “Balancing
of Interest Test”
Also Clearly Favors
Decriminalization
Let us look at the balancing of interest test.
Let us have it
in our mind that the only justification why a State would make an act a crime
is because it is an offense against its existence, its government, and its interest.
Talking about
libel per se, it can never be an offense against the existence of the State, or
against the existence of the government.
It may be an offense against an interest.
And talking
about the State’s interest, there is no other in this case except for the
interest to protect every citizen’s honor in order for their mind to live in
peace in return for the taxes he pays.
But contrary
to this interest, there are two State interests that should stand in the way.
The State of
the Philippines also has two interests: (a)
to look good before the international community that it is a state that does
not repress expression and press; and (b)
to comply in good faith, as a state party, with the Universal Declarations of
Human Rights that calls for respect to liberty of expression in all states as
spelled out under Article 19 thereof.
The said
article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights signed on December 10,
1948, reads:
Article 19.
Everyone has
the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
For sure, most
of us if not all will agree that these two interests of the State itself are
more than enough to tip the balance against its own interest to protect its
citizen’s honor, which can be remedied by a civil action for punitive damages
that is in place under the Civil Code.
Let us pit this interest to protect the citizens against the
interests served by the publication of defamatory imputations.
In cases where
the defamatory imputations published are directed against a particular or group
of public officials, the interest of the press is obvious: to serve a social
and moral duty to inform the public about ineptitude, moral or otherwise, under
the constitutional doctrine that says, “Public
Office is a Public Trust.”
On public
officials, imputations normally consist in the poor performance of official
functions. There is no problem with
this, it being immediately discernable as qualifiedly privileged under
subparagraph 2 of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.
But some
attacks go into the very “private life” of a public official.
Among these
“private life” acts of public officials are keeping a mistress, being a drug
addict, being a gay having a macho man, being a married woman having a
paramour, adultery, concubinage, bigamy, being a gambling addict as he or she
is found always in the casinos, among others.
These
officials should not be allowed to invoke “private life” because more than
academic and experience resume, moral fitness is the top most quality that must
be the basis of appointment to public office.
There is no
need to argue that a corrupt private life affects the performance of an
official function. A government official
hiding a corrupt private life will surely resort to corruption to sustain his or
her vices.
Thus, the
interest of the media in exposing these corrupt private lives of government
official is obvious: to serve the legal, moral and social duty to the country
and people. This therefore far outweighs any State interest, if there is any, in
protecting the honors of officials having corrupt private lives.
On public
figures notoriously or pervasively known to the public, defamatory imputations
vary within a very wide range of issues.
As a popular figure, one has the moral obligation to act decently
because he or she is being idolized by a considerable part of the public, that
there are even some who would duplicate whatever their idols do in a blind
obedience to somebody being admired so much.
Thus, the
interest of the media in exposing those corrupt acts of public figures, which
happen most often among writers on movies and entertainment, is also to serve
the interest of legal, moral and social duty to inform the public. Like that of public officials, the ultimate
benefit of the public is a lesson learned that the acts of the said persons
must not be replicated.
Thus, it is clear that the interest of media in cases of
defamatory imputations against public figures far outweighs the interest of the
State in protecting the honor of these persons, who, in the first place, do not
deserve protection for voluntarily doing immoral or corrupt acts.
On private
persons who are taken as public figures by reason of voluntary act of stirring
or joining a controversy, the interest of the media in exposing or criticizing
him or her is no less noble than that in defamatory imputations against public
officials or public figures.
Examples of
these kinds of persons are those who commit crimes thereby voluntarily putting
themselves into a limelight; a private person who voluntarily joined an ongoing
controversy like Jun Lozada cannot complain if his honor is being
assaulted.
A private
person who commits murder cannot complain if the crime itself is discussed
before the bar of public opinion. A
private person who engaged in illicit activities cannot complain if the
defamatory imputations told the public consisted in those illicit acts.
Defamatory
imputations against these types of persons are qualifiedly privileged if the
ascriptions are limited or connected to the matters within the limited range of
issues.
On purely
private persons, the defamatory imputations are most likely unjustified and
there is virtually a zero interest for media on this matter.
However, the
interests alone of the State to implement the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and to look good before the international community are more than enough
to balance the State’s interest in protecting the honor of these kinds of
persons.
After all, the State interest in protecting the honor of its
citizens is served by giving the people the cause of action for an action for
punitive damages on top of moral damage awards, actual damages proximately
caused by the defamations and attorney’s fees.
Ergo, it is
very clear that even under the “Balancing of Interest Test”, which is less
strict than the “clear and present danger rule”, the interest of
decriminalization of libel far stands out.
D. Libel as a Criminal Law
Fails Against Substantial
Due Process Test
It is
unfortunate that for more than three-fourths of a century, there has been no
real challenge put up against the constitutionality of libel as stated by
Justice Nachurra in his dissent in Chavez vs Gonzalez, or what is
otherwise known as the “Hello Garci” case.
Given a
chance, though, NPC would be willing to take one test case.
The reason
that the stand of NPC that libel is unconstitutional is that it fails when
applied to the substantial due process test formulated by jurisprudence to
gauge whether a law, rule, policy or circular lies within the framework of due
process in making laws.
The substantial
due process yardstick measures whether a law, rule, policy or ordinance is
constitutional under the following apparatuses:
(a) Is the end
lawful?;
(b) Is the means
reasonably connected with the ends?
(c) Is the means
not discriminatory or oppressive?
The purpose of
libel law is to protect innocent individuals from reputation-damaging
publications. No doubt, this is for the
common good and the subject is lawful.
The means
employed to achieve the end, which is by imprisoning those who destroy honor of
individuals, is no doubt reasonably connected to the purpose of the law.
Before going
further, let us examine how many means or ways are available for us to achieve
the purpose of libel.
The Sate may
resort to giving a cause of action for a civil damages or a cause of action to
file a criminal complaint.
And between
the two available remedies, criminal libel is no doubt more oppressive and more
discriminatory.
The fact that
there is an available remedy that is less oppressive and less discriminatory,
which is a civil action for damages, suggests that employing criminal libel as
a means to achieve the end is unconstitutional.
E. Libel is
More of a Private Dispute
Between the
Libeled and Libeler
Libel is more
of a private dispute between the libeled and the libeler. The other persons who have read or listened
to the libel do not truly care.
Hence, it is
best to leave to them the resolution of their own conflict.
F. Age-old Breach of the Peace Argument
as
Justification for Criminal Libel is Obsolete
The
original justification advanced to justify criminal libel is that it tends to
breach the peace, whereby the one libeled would run amuck.
This
is no longer obtaining under the present regime.
The
listener or the reader has the obligation to react within the bounds of the law
or he or she will run afoul. And to
punish the libeler just because one person ran amok is giving premium to the
amuck than the liberty of the press.
Since
time immemorial, there has been no report that anybody ever ran amuck just
because he or she was libeled.
The
fact that breach of the peace did not happen despite the fact that many libel
cases have been filed and many exposes have been recorded in newspaper and
magazine files is enough proof that “breach of the peace” argument is obsolete.
G. Libel is
not an Act of Moral Turpitude
Moral
turpitude means “moral depravity.”
It is hard to
imagine that defaming another’s honor is an indication of lack of regard to
morality.
Rather, a
journalist’s decision to write and publish about immoral act of another is an
indication that the media man has high regard for moral values.
The
Conclusion
The reasons
presented for the decriminalization are obviously overwhelming.
As such, it
stands to reason for the Senate and the House of Representatives to GIVE DECRIMINALIZATION OF LIBEL A CHANCE.
Respectfully
yours,
ROY
C. MABASA
President
Comments