Fatal mistake of prosecutors in libel
Fatal mistake
of prosecutors in libel
By BERTENI "TOTO" CATALUÑA CAUSING
Author of the book entitled "Simplified Libel Law in the Philippines"
How malice in libel must be stated in information sheet?
I share this part of my petition for review for the Supreme Court concerning a novel thought about how the element of malice must be stated in the accusatory page, or information sheet.
My proposition here is:
IT IS A FATAL DEFECT OF THE PROSECUTORS TO STATE IN THE INFORMATION FOR LIBEL THAT ELEMENT OF MALICE IN GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "INTENTIONALLY, MALICIOUSLY AND KNOWINGLY IMPEACH THE HONOR AND REPUTATION" OF A PUBLIC OFFICIAL.
Read my analysis below. Rest assured this is something new idea on libel.
Fatally-defective
information
The two (2) information sheets for libel are defective
because these failed to state the facts constituting the essential element of actual malice.
The facts
constituting the element of actual malice must be stated in libel informations
if the offended party are public officials.
As will be explained
below, it is insufficient for the information just to state: “knowingly,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with malicious intent of
impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of” a public
official.
This is because
the Supreme Court has already made it as a law that if the offended party is a
public officer as in the case at bar, the actual
malice test must be the gauge in determining whether there exists the
element of malice.
Some of these
case laws are Guingguing vs Court of Appeals[1],
Vasquez
vs Court of Appeals[2],
Borjal
vs Court of Appeals[3],
Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc. vs
Ago Medical and Educational Center[4],
and many others.
The Supreme
Court adopted the ACTUAL MALICE DOCTRINE from the US Supreme Court’s rulings,
beginning with New York Times vs Sullivan[5].
So that all
informations for libel where the offended party are public officials must state
specific facts constituing actual malice to duly inform the accused of the
nature and cause of accusation.
And if this is
not obeyed to the letter, there is doubt whether the accused is duly informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Let it be
stressed that it is the duty of the State to DULY inform the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
And if this duty
is not discharged, the accused must be acquitted on the ground of lack of due
process, specifically lack of notice.
This is so
because if an accused cannot duly understand the nature and cause of
accusation, he will be guessing only on how to explain his side.
If that is so,
there can be no valid arraignment. If arraignment is not valid, then the
accused cannot be convicted.
The same is the
legal effect if the information fails to state an essential set of facts
constituting the crime charged: no valid arraignment such that there is no
compliance with the due process of law
and in that the accused cannot be convicted.
There are two
kinds of malice.
The first kind
of malice is one that is connected to the hatred in the heart of the speaker
that he deliberately uttered words that defame or hurt the person against whom
the speaker is angry at. Here, it does
not matter whether the words are true or false or that the harsh opinions are
founded on truth or falsity.
Hatred, love, motive
of revenge, envy, jealousy, greed, extreme desire for aggrandizement, desire
for glory, desire for sex, rivalry, ambition, desire for promotion, and other
desires: they are all potent forces that each of them is enough to impel a person
to defame or hurt another.
But in case the
drive drove the man bold enough to expose the truth, that is not malice in the
contemplation of Actual Malice.
One may be so
angry at another that the former decided to publish the truth against the
latter who is a public figure or a public officer and that truth maligned the
the latter in public contempt. The
motive of revenge here is not material. It is always not libel under the test
of Actual Malice. It is founded on the
truth.
With this, it is
hoped that it is now clear that the specific facts that must be stated in any
libel information must serve the requirements of the Actual Malice standard in
libel.
In other words, there
are two possibilities in hate words: either the words uttered may have been
founded on truth or outrightly false, although both tend to defame.
As
differentiated from plain ill-will, specks and spikes, Actual Malice means
publishing false defamatory item despite knowledge of falsity or publishing
with reckless disregard of the falsity of the defamatory item.
So that even if
there was ill-will, specks and spikes, even if the anger was exceeding, there
is no actual malice if the defamatory item published is not false or the falsity
of the item was not proved by the accuser, or that the defamatory item
published did not evoke a situation or circumstance that should prompt the
publisher to check the veracity of the defamatory item.
So that every
libel information involving a public officer or a public figure as the offended
party must state the ELEMENT OF ACTUAL MALICE with the specific facts that the
accused knew the falsity of the defamatory item yet he proceeded with
publishing the same, or that the accused knew that the facts presented a
situation or a circumstance that he should check the truth or falsity of the
defamatory item but he did not do so and proceeded with the publication.
This is how the
libel information should be written to reflect the actual malice element of
libel if the offended party is a public officer or a public figure. As demonstrated above, the doctrine of actual
malice commands that an accused cannot be convicted of libel unless the
prosecution proved first the falsity of the defamatory item and that the
accused knew the falsity before publishing the item yet he proceeded in
publishing the same, or unless the prosecution proved first that the defamatory
imputation is false and that the accused was prompted by a situation or
circumstance that he should have checked the truth or falsity of the
imputation.
So that if what
is an issue is a news story that is a straight news reporting, when there is no
opinion involved, one statement of facts that complies with the actual malice
standard may be stated this way: “...published that Governor Jose Abad Santos
plotted to murder Mayor Andres Bonifacio despite prior knowledge it false...”
If the straight
news reported that Catholic Bishop Oscar Cruz was charged with rape committed
against a minor, it is natural that the publisher must first check this with
sources and only after confirmation that there was indeed a complaint-affidavit
for rape that was filed can the publisher publish the news report without any
liability to libel. And if Bishop Cruz
filed a complaint and it had to be elevated to the court, one statment of facts
that complies with the actual malice standard may be stated this way: “...published
with reckless disregard of the falsity that Catholic Bishop Oscar Cruz was
charged with rape committed against a minor...”
And if what is
involved is a column or an opinion article that was published, it is also settled
by Borjal
vs CA that comments or remarks that are of public interest and fairly
inferred from reasonably supposed facts are protected against libel liability,
even after the facts turned out to be false after the publication.
If the opinions
to be considered are those written in this case by accused Claudio Daquer, one
statement of facts that complies with the malice standard may be stated this
way: “...published
an opinion that Arnie Grande, the head of the City Sports Council of Puerto
Princesa City, was ‘kuto na nakapatong sa kalabaw,’ ‘mokong,’ ‘gago’ when these
were inferred from facts that the
accused knew to be false.”
The instant two
(2) information sheets for libel did not state this minimum malice standard
when opinions that are matters of public interest because they were directed
against a public officer, a city sports head in this case, did not state as
suggested in the immediately preceding paragraph.
INSTEAD, the
present two (2) information sheets for libel state the element of malice as
this:
Criminal Case No. 18814
xxx xxx
That on or about 4th
day of April 2003, at Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
the News Editor/Writer and publisher of the publication known as “The Palawan
Mirror,” edited and published in the City of Puerto Princesa, which has a
considerable circulation in said city and in the Province of Palawan, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully, and
feloniously, and with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue and
reputation of Anrie A. Grande, Sports Development Officer III-Program Manager
of the City Government of Puerto Princesa, and with malicious intent of
injuring and exposing said Anrie A. Grande to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of its weekly publication of
the Palawan Mirror dated April 4-10, 2003, Volume XXI Number 12, a certain
article entitled “KUTO NA NAIS MAGING KALABAW SA CITY HALL”, quoted
verbatim hereunder, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 18815
xxx xxx
That on or about 11th
day of April 2003, at Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
the News Editor/Writer and publisher of the publication known as “The Palawan
Mirror,” edited and published in the City of Puerto Princesa, which has a
considerable circulation in said city and in the Province of Palawan, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully, and
feloniously, and with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue and
reputation of Anrie A. Grande, Sports Development Officer III-Program Manager
of the City Government of Puerto Princesa, and with malicious intent of
injuring and exposing said Anrie A. Grande to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of its weekly publication
of the Palawan Mirror dated April 11-17, 2003, Volume XXI Number 13, a certain
article entitled “UNSOLICITED ADVICE SA “MEDIA PRACS”, quoted verbatim
hereunder, to wit:
Clear, the two (2) information
sheets do not comply.
The first and
the second information stated that actual malice element in this way: ”... wilfully (sic), unlawfully, and
feloniously, and with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue and
reputation of Anrie A. Grande, Sports Development Officer III-Program Manager
of the City Government of Puerto Princesa, and with malicious intent of
injuring and exposing said Anrie A. Grande to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule…”
As proposed
above, even if the accused Claudio Daquer was exceedingly angry at or hating
Anre Grande too much, it cannot be seen how statements of “malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of”
convey the meaning that Daquer knew the facts upon which he based his opinions
were false.
Of course,
general statement that there was malice cannot satisfy the Constitutional
requirement that the accused must be duly
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. So that the actual two (2) information sheets
for libel filed and read against accused Daquer did not comply with the
constitutional requirement that Daquer must be duly informed of the nature and
cause of the acusation against him.
As a result of
the general statement of malice, even the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals proved to have been confused.
Both the RTC and
the CA mistook the empathic words “kuto”, “mokong” and “gago” for actual malice.
The two lower
courts DID NOT EXPLAIN WHY THEY SHOULD REQUIRE DAQUER TO VERIFY THE FACTS FROM
WHICH HE BASED HIS HARSH OPINIONS WHEN WHAT THE OFFENDED PARTY DID WAS ONLY TO
MAKE A “CATEGORICAL DENIAL” AND CONTENTED TO THAT WITHOUT SUBMITTING EVIDENCE
WHY THE FACTS WRITTEN IN THE OPINION ARTICLES WERE FALSE.
Was it not
believable for a sports official who is not a priest to have committed those
acts that are manipulative, scheming and chair-lifting in order to defeat
rivals to the position and glory before the eyes of Mayor Edward Hagedorn?
In fact, even if
the offended party proved the falsity of the facts, the prosecution failed to
prove that Daquer knew the falsities prior to the writing of the opinion
articles.
The two lower
courts did not penalize him for the content of the facts upon which Daquer
based his opinions.
Nevertheless,
what is important now is not whether the prosecution proved actual malice or not.
What is the
single thing that spells the life or death of this case is THE FACT THAT THE
TWO (2) INFORMATION SHEETS FOR LIBEL DO NOT STATE THAT ACCUSED DAQUER KNEW OF
THE FALSITIES OF THE FACTS HE USED AND THAT KNOWLEDGE OCCURRED JUST BEFORE THE
PUBLICATION OF THESE HARSH CRITICISMS.
The wisdom above
means that even if the speech involved hate against the target of the speech,
and the words uttered were full of hatred, the public officials as the offended
parties cannot escape from the requisite that they must prove actual malice.
This wisdom of
the Court proceeds from the basic idea that the interest of the society and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs as
eloquently uttered by Justice Brennan.
Because public
service is a public trust, the State has adopted the policy enunciated in US
vs. Bustos[6]
to ensure that the ends of public service is approximated. In other words, public opinions and
criticisms of public officials are the bedrock of democracy. If these are limited, what happens is anarchy and warlordisms.
Thus, the
Supreme Court said in Bustos:
The
interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of
public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its
probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer
under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the
balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with
reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and
dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize
defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must
expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any
official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to
the Judiciary -- to any or all the agencies of Government -- public opinion
should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.
It is essential in
libel cases filed by offended parties who are public officers that the
published facts from which the opinions were drawn are false and that the accused
knew before the publication was done that these facts are false.
It is basic that when an element of the crime is not
stated, even if proved it cannot be appricated.
In the same manner that when a less serious matter, a qualifying
circumstance or an aggravating circumstance, cannot be appreciated even if
proved if these are not stated in the information.
Ergo, on the basis of the fact that the facts
constituting the elements of actual malice were not stated in the two (2)
informations for libel, the instant two criminal cases against Daquer cannot go
other way but a judgment of acquittal.
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